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Abstract: We analyze rural household livelihood and children’s educational investment 
decisions in a post-conflict setting located in the Chittagong Hill Tracts region of 
Bangladesh. The study represents a contribution to the microeconomic analysis of 
conflict. Another innovation of the paper lies in the fact that we employ information 
about subjective perceptions of violent experiences, which is in turn used to explain 
household economic decision making. Heightened subjective perceptions of violence 
lower consumption expenditure, but it can raise land use intensity, and more risky mixed 
crop cultivation. In some case experiences of displacement and other violence raises the 
likelihood of households sending children to school. This indicates that a specific post-
conflict ‘phoenix’ factor may be in operation, even without substantial infrastructure 
reconstruction.  Also, the trauma emanating from actual past experiences combined with 
current high perceptions of risk of violence after an imperfect accord ending a low-
intensity conflict may make people bolder and more risk taking in order to enhance their 
long-term future. We, therefore, also make a contribution to the literature on a non-linear 
relationship between violence and the temporal patterning of livelihood decision-making. 
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The object of this paper is to analyze rural household livelihood and educational 
investment decisions for future generations in a post-conflict setting located in the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) region of Bangladesh (see annex 4 for a map). This is a 
region in the South-Eastern part of the country where a low level insurgency took place 
between 1976 and 1997, which officially terminated after a peace accord in December, 
1997. The armed struggle was between the state’s security forces, mainly the Bangladesh 
army, and the ethnically distinct local population, in an otherwise fairly homogenous 
nation in terms of language and religion. The insurgency aimed at regional autonomy 
rather than independence, but the principal local grievance was against officially 
sponsored land encroachment by outsiders (mainstream Bangladeshis or Bengalis), who 
posed a threat not only to local livelihoods, but potentially also to a distinct local way of 
life; see Chakma (2006) and Roy (2000), for example. All of this took place in the land-
hungry context of the most densely populated larger country in the world, which is also a 
low-income developing nation where agriculture continues to be the main source of the 
population’s livelihood. Thus, neo-Malthusian factors may be at work in Bangladesh. 
Population growth adds to land scarcity, which can be further exacerbated by 
environmental degradation, and can fuel conflict over greed for ever scarcer land and 
environmental resources (Homer-Dixon, 1999).  
 
There is now a substantial literature on the causes of large scale internal conflict in the 
rational choice tradition. These explanations have tended to centre on either the grievance 
hypothesis (mainly linked to inequalities between distinct groups delineated by ethnicity, 
religion or some other marker), or the greed motivation (reflecting the desire to control 
capturable rents); see Murshed (2010, chapter 3) for a review. In reality these competing 
explanations may be actually complementary, as greed and grievance motivations often 
follow one another and can be simultaneously present as an armed dispute develops 
(Murshed, 2010). A great deal of empirical work has also been conducted to test the 
empirical validity of these allegedly competing theories. The results are inconclusive, 
mainly due to data paucity on group based inequality (also known as horizontal 
inequality). But the important point is that many of the quantitative studies on civil war  
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are cross-country in nature, where the experiences of civil war in different and far-flung 
countries are lumped together in one single statistical (econometric) exercise. One can, 
therefore, be sceptical about the results of such regression analyses, as the various 
populations under scrutiny are not necessarily drawn from a homogenous population. 
Quite apart from this conceptual objection to cross-country quantitative analyses, there is 
also a need to conduct more systematic quantitative studies of the drivers and 
consequences of conflict at a more local (micro) level within nation states, a research area 
that is still relatively neglected; see Verwimp, Justino and Brück (2009) for a plea for 
more such studies. Armed conflict may have far reaching consequences for rural 
livelihood strategies, including investment decisions and cropping patterns. This may 
contribute to analysis of poverty, as well as development in general, particularly rural 
development. Lacunae associated with localised conflict become even more acute when it 
comes to the economic analyses of the short and long term impacts of conflict on 
households’ decision-making. The first innovation of the paper is that it is able to make a 
contribution in this connection, based on an unique data-set compiled during a socio-
economic survey of households resident in this area in 2007 (Barkat et. al, 2009).  
 
The rural farming household is no stranger to risky outlays, as returns to cropping or 
animal husbandry are subject to a number of risks and uncertainties. The nature of these 
risks and uncertainties can be altered by armed conflict of a sufficiently long duration, 
and also depend on the intensity of the conflict. This affects the livelihood and investment 
decisions of households. Prolonged war can also change patterns of property rights, 
usufructuary rights under common ownership, as well as social capital governing inter-
household interaction. The livelihood framework acknowledges an inherent inseparability 
between production and consumption decisions for rural households (Bardhan and Udry, 
1999, chapter 2) which effects labour allocation between farm and off-farm (including 
education) activities, as well as cropping (and animal husbandry activities) for own 
consumption and the market.     
 
Our analysis is conducted in the post-accord era, a decade after a peace treaty which 
allegedly ended the war. As is well known, treaties and accords across the developing  
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world rarely coincide with the total cessation of violence, and the fear that conflict will 
reignite pervades many post-conflict societies. Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (2008), in 
their cross-country study, point out that civil war is likely to resume within a decade in a 
typical low-income nation. Another important policy issue in post-conflict environments 
is the resumption of economic activity and growth. As far as economic recovery after the 
formal cessation of hostilities is concerned, post-conflict growth can be lopsided, 
favouring infrastructure reconstruction over agriculture or manufacturing due to war time 
collateral damage to public assets as well as the perceived riskiness of investment in these 
sectors which take a long time to yield dividends (Addison and Murshed, 2005). On the 
other hand, other authors emphasize a more general ‘Phoenix’ factor (Organski and 
Kugler, 1977; Koubi, 2005). In other words, rapid economic growth (in the aggregate 
macroeconomic sense) follows intense and prolonged hostilities. There can, however, be 
differences across various economic sectors. Crucially, perceptions about the security 
environment may affect investment and livelihood choices. The second innovation of the 
paper lies in the fact that the survey employed in the paper contains information about 
perceptions of violent experiences, which in turn impact on household economic decision 
making. The use of this data, which has subjective (psychological) and objective 
elements, is in line with contemporary behavioural economics. As will be seen below our 
results suggest that contrary to conventional wisdom, which points to increased 
subsistence cultivation following war, heightened perceptions of violence can encourage 
risk taking, greater crop diversification into cash crops and greater investment in the 
education of future generations. This has similarities to the findings of Nillesen and 
Verwimp (2010) in the context of rural Burundi, where conflict can result in the increased 
production of cash and export crops for the market rather than mere subsistence 
cultivation.    
 
The research question, at least as far as developing countries are concerned, is whether 
there is a strong negative association between conflict risk and economic prosperity. 
Bates (2001) has indicated that this relationship can, however, be non-linear over time. 
Increased prosperity at first can induce greater violence, especially because of the 
dislocating effects of rapid growth (Olson, 1963), and because peace accords may  
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atrophy and decay.
3 But, prolonged growth can only be maintained if conflict declines. 
Our results make a contribution to this literature on the non-linear relationship between 
violence and prosperity, because it seems that higher perceptions of violence may 
encourage more market based activity plus longer term investment in human capital.   
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 contains a brief sketch of the 
context of the conflict in Bangladesh and its Chittagong Hill Tracts region, section 3 
contains a description of the data and methodology, section 4 presents our statistical 
(econometric) results, and section 5 is by way of conclusion.  
 
2    The Chittagong Hill Tracts Region of Bangladesh 
 
Bangladesh is in the Ganges  delta formed by the confluence of three rivers; Ganges, the 
Brahmaputra and the Meghna which creates one of the most fertile plains in the world. It 
is one of the highest densely (1,229/sq.km) populated countries of the world where the 
amount of per capita arable land is only 0.1 hectare in 2007. It is a low income 
developing country with about 50% of the population (using the international poverty line 
of below $1.25 per day) living in poverty (World Bank; 2010). Over last two decades, 
Bangladesh’s economy experienced growth rates of around 5.5% per annum, but still a 
large part of GDP emanatse from traditional agriculture (World Development Indicators). 
This makes land the scarcest and competed over resource in Bangladesh. Land grabbing 
is a common phenomenon in Bangladesh, and various types of economic and political 
exploitation, as well as outright crime, are associated with land holding (Barkat and Roy, 
2008).  
 
Bangladesh is mostly ethnically homogenous, with the vast majority of the population 
being Bengali speaking and Muslim. There are a few distinct ethnicities who differ in 
both language and religion. These groups are mainly concentrated in the CHT region. The 
CHT region occupies about one-tenth (13,189 sq.km) of the total territory of Bangladesh. 
                                                            
3 Tadjoeddin and Murshed (2007) find that routine violence in Java first rises with per-capita income and educational 
achievement, but declines after a certain threshold of education and income is reached.  
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This region is situated in the southeastern part of the country, and is covered with lush 
green hills, with a relatively larger proportion of afforested areas. The area is divided into 
three administrative districts; Bandarban, Khagrachari and Rangamati. From an economic 
and strategic point of view CHT is important for national policy makers. It is adjacent to 
the two Indian states Tripura on the north and Mizoram on the east and by Myanmar on 
the south and east. Insurgency in the Indian north-eastern states and Myanmar raises the 
military importance of this region (Roy, 2000, Barkat et al. 2009 and Mohsin, 2003).  
 
According to the population census of Bangladesh there are 11 ethnic groups namely 
Bawm, Chak, Chakma, Khumi, Khyang, Lushai, Marma, Mro, Pangkhua, Tanchangya, 
and Tripura living in the CHT. Their appearance, languages, and cultural traditions are 
significantly distinct from the Bengali speaking majority population of Bangladesh. They 
are mostly of Mongolian Stock and closer to in appearance and culture to their 
neighbours in north-eastern India, Myanmar and Thailand. Buddhism, Hinduism, and 
Christianity, but not Islam, are prevalent among these ethnicities. They have their own 
language in both oral and written form, although many of the scripts are under threat. The 
indigenous peoples of CHT are often identified as Jumma people, derived from the word 
jum (swidden or slash and burn, or shifting cultivation), which served as the cornerstone 
of their livelihoods. They are officially recognized as ‘Hillmen’, ‘Tribal’, or ‘Jumiya’ 
(Swidden cultivator)
4. The proportion of non-indigenous (Bengali speaking) population 
in CHT has been increasing over time. According to the 1991 census, indigenous groups 
constitute 51.4% of the CHT total population of about one million (Adnan 2004, Mohsin 
2003 and Roy 2000). 
 
Land is the key factor of production in the CHT economy, to which the indigenous 
people are deeply rooted. Traditionally, almost all the communities were engaged in 
subsistence jum or swidden cultivation. Besides jum cultivation, there exists small scale 
plough cultivation as well. The indigenous peoples were self-sufficient in terms of food 
in earlier times. Despite its apparent relative land abundance in the context of 
                                                            
4 In this paper the term ‘indigenous’ is used to indicate the tribal and/or ethnic population of CHT ignoring the debate 
on the indigenous status in the official documents of Bangladesh. For details, see Ahmed (2010).  
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Bangladesh, the CHT region is actually land-scarce in terms of availability of land for 
cultivation (only 23% of the land is arable). There is a sharp decline in per capita arable 
land during last few decades. On the basis of available data on land and population it is 
estimated that in 1974 the amount of per capita arable land was about 0.45 hectare which 
declined to about 0.24 hectare in 1991.  Most of the land is either non-inhabitable due to 
its topography, or is restricted by law (reserve or protected forest areas). The land 
ownership patterns as well as types of land in CHT also differ from that of plain regions. 
Customary (common) ownership of land exists here, and at the same time private 
property rights are also recognised by the State which makes the ownership issue more 
complex (Roy 2000, Adnan 2004 and Barkat et.al. 2009).  
 
About one-fourth of the total CHT land is occupied by reserve forests, which restricts 
cultivation and extraction by indigenous people. Indigenous people are permitted to use 
the rest of the land recognized as Unclassified State Forest (USF) in addition to the 
‘District Forest’ under the discretion of the administration. The CHT region enjoyed an 
autonomous status until 1860 when the British took it over under their direct 
administration. The 'Chittagong Hill Tracts Regulation of 1900' declared it to be an 
'Exclusive Area'; putting an embargo on 'outsiders' settling or purchasing land in the 
territory. This 'excluded area' status of CHT was replaced by 'tribal area' in the second 
constitution of Pakistan in 1962. This amendment in the constitution was aimed at paving 
the way for an influx of non-indigenous people into the region in large numbers. 
Consequently the indigenous leadership (Raja, Headman, Karbari) lost control over the 
land (Roy, 2000 and Mohsin, 2003). 
 
Due to the construction of an artificial reservoir by damming the river Karnafuli at Kaptai 
in the 1960s for the purposes of power generation, approximately 1,036 square kilometres 
was submerged, including the main urban centre of CHT, and 54,000 acres of highly 
prized cultivable land was lost in the river valleys. The loss of productive land, along 
with displacement and uprooting of people, increased demographic and economic 
pressures leading to impoverishment and insecurity, which gave rise to resentment among 
the indigenous people. Finally, a state sponsored migration programme settled about  
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400,000 landless Bengali speaking people in the CHT during 1979-1986 manifesting 
need/greed for the implicit rents from change in land use. It led to dispossession of 
thousands of acres of lands claimed by indigenous people (Adnan 2004, Barkat et.al. 
2009 and Roy 2000).  
 
During the civil war leading to the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971, some 
indigenous leaders were ambivalent towards a separate Bangladeshi state; this sowed the 
seeds for long lasting mistrust deepening and grievances between the then nationalist 
politicians and the indigenous peoples.  Soon after independence of Bangladesh, a 
delegation of the CHT people led by M N Larma, member of the Constituent Assembly 
and a veteran fighter in the Liberation War, submitted a memorandum to the government 
of Bangladesh demanding constitutional recognition of the indigenous communities 
living in the CHT and regional autonomy for protection of their distinct ethnic and 
cultural identity. However, neither the recognition of the communities nor regional 
autonomy has received constitutional recognition in Bangladesh (Adnan 2004 and Barkat 
et.al. 2009). 
 
Successive Bangladeshi governments of both a military and democratic complexion 
adopted mixed strategies of using military force to quell rebellion and protest, while at 
the same time encouraging, or colluding with, a population transfer programme. In 1976 
armed forces were also deployed in CHT in a classic ‘Aid to Civil Power’ operation, 
which triggered tensions in the region. A few indigenous political groups (Parbatya 
Chattagram Jana Samhiti Samiti or PCJSS) adopted the policy of armed struggle against 
the intrusion by the authorities
5. Under the counter-insurgency strategy, demographic 
engineering interventions aimed at settling a large number (400,000) of Bengali speaking 
households in CHT was seen as enhancing the size of population loyal to the state, and 
these fresh settlements could act as a counterweight to indigenous peoples’ demands for 
rights and regional autonomy. Due to the state sponsored settlement programme, a 
considerable number of the indigenous population were uprooted from their homesteads, 
something which intensified the armed struggle. About 54,000 indigenous people crossed 
                                                            
5 The conflict in the CHT of Bangladesh is coded as  a minor armed conflict, according to PRIO-Uppsala methodology; 
see http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/Armed-Conflicts-Version-X-2009/ (accessed on 
November 05, 2010)  
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the border and took refuge in neighbouring Tripura state of India and 50,000 indigenous 
people became IDPs (internally displaced persons). During the counter insurgency, some 
11 massacres are alleged, when a good number of indigenous people were killed. Women 
were raped to demoralize the indigenous people. According to government statistics 
about 1,200 people were killed, about 600 people were kidnapped and about 4,000 people 
were injured by the armed force of the indigenous rebellion (locally known as Shanti 
Bahini; SB) between 1980 and 1991. The indigenous people were under continuous 
surveillance of security forces (Mohsin, 2003).
6  
 
In the post-cold war era, and after the restoration of democracy in Bangladesh, pressure 
for a political solution mounted. This led to an accord between the PCJSS and the 
Government of Bangladesh on December 02, 1997, which has come to be known as “The 
Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord 1997”. The Accord was incomplete; the ‘United Peoples 
Democratic Front (UPDF)’ continues the struggle for full autonomy (Mohsin 2003).   
Continuing land disputes, the non-restitution of land to indigenous peoples, the non-
withdrawal of the Bangladesh army, the poor rehabilitation of refugees and internally 
displaced persons (IDP) along with opposition to the Peace Accord make the post-
conflict situation of CHT fragile. Indigenous people living in this area continue 
experiencing various types of violence, mistreatment and mistrust from settlers who have 
not been re-settled in other parts of Bangladesh. These are manifested through various 
types of low intensity violence like arson, abduction, extortion, harassment of women and 
children and restricted mobility (Barkat et al. 2009). This research captures the effects of 
such violence through factoring in the subjective perceptions of potential violence as a 
factor in livelihood decision-making. 
 
3  Data and Methodology 
 
                                                            
6Details from ‘The Report of Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission’,   http://www.iwgia.org/graphics/Synkron-
Library/Documents/publications/Downloadpublications/Books/Life%20is%20not%20ours%201-108.pdf (accessed on 
January 11, 2011)  
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Our information encompasses both quantitative and qualitative data, where the latter 





The “Socio-economic Baseline Survey of Chittagong Hill Tracts” is the source of our 
quantitative data; see Barkat et. al (2009). This survey was commissioned in 2007 and the 
survey report was published by CHTDF-UNDP
8 in 2009. The data was collected for the 
year 2007 from a cross section of households (both transmigrated Bengalis and 
indigenous) living in CHT. This survey is recognized as the first socio-economic baseline 
survey of that region with a dominance of quantitative data. The study aimed at 
generating benchmark information to be subsequently used to track periodic progress 
attained through interventions by the CHTDF-UNDP. In line with our objectives in this 
paper, we have used a part of the dataset considering only indigenous households.  
 
The sample design of the survey captured the whole region of CHT and the diversity of 
indigenous population. The sample comprised 3,238 households, where the number of 
indigenous households was 1,786. The sampling procedure carefully considered the 
geographical and ethnic diversity of CHT and its population. Although the main focus of 
the survey was collecting data on the socio-economic status of CHT population it also 
collected data on peace-confidence building. The measurable broader categories of 
variables are demographic, economic, social and cultural, infrastructure facilities, and 
peace-confidence building.  
 
 
Salience of perceptions of violence and construction of composite violence index 
 
Data on different types of violence in the form of either household’s experience or 
perceptions under the heading of ‘constraints of peace’ and ‘element of confidence-
                                                            
7 Space constraints preclude a discussion of the qualitative data, but more details can be obtained from the 
authors.   
8 Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Facility of the United Nations Development Programme.   
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building’ were collected.  Data on real life experience of violence were collected for a ten 
year period (1998-2007) after the Peace Accord; whereas perceptual data on threat of 
violence was for the year 2007 only. This paper uses the variables which are based on 
household perception on different types of violence for the year 2007. The reason for 
choosing the perceptual data on violence is that the survey collected data on violence 
perceptions and socio-economic or livelihood status for the year 2007, which makes the 
data set chronologically compatible for regression analysis. This research is aimed at 
understanding household decision-making as active agents not as victims of actual 
violence. Therefore it is appropriate to use perception of risk of violence as the variable 
which households actually take into account in decision-making (Rizal and Yokota, 
2006).  
 
A composite index variable of threat perceptions for violence was constructed for this 
research. The original survey used 31 indicators to capture the present status of threat of 
violence in CHT perceived by households. The Likert scale method was used in the 
questionnaire to collect data on the threat of violence. Under the broad heading of 
‘Obstacles to Peace’ data was collected by using a 3 point qualitative value scale, while 
under broad heading of ‘Elements of Confidence-building’ a 5 point qualitative value 
scale was used. Each scale was devised according to the specificity and nature of each 
variable. The scale contained qualitative value labels (Likert scale) and quantitative 
(numeric) interpretations for each of the levels. On the scale, the minimum value level (1 
or 0) represents lowest/worst status while the maximum value level (3 or 4) indicates 
highest/best situation on ‘Obstacles to Peace’ and ‘Elements of Confidence-building’ 
respectively. In the present study 13 indicators were selected from 31 indicators used in 
original survey to construct a composite violence index
9. To ensure consistency in the 
value level of the Likert scale used for all the indicators under ‘constraints of peace’ and 
‘element of confidence-building’, an adjustment has been made by recoding the 
qualitative value level with new numeric interpretation. The new Likert scale contains 
                                                            
9 Indicators considered in preparing the composite violence index are; abduction, extortion, armed conflict, 
communal threat, restricted movement, insecurity of women and children, trust in other communities, 
eviction from land, repression of security forces, safety and security feelings, cultural freedom, and 
customary right.   
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three point values scale where low=1, Medium=2 and High=3. The new value scale with 
numeric interpretation was done by re-coding of original value level used in the survey. 
The methodology of re-coding was devised through rigorous discussion with the team 
leader involved in the original survey for accuracy and validation (see Annex table 1). 
The value of composite index for perceived threat of violence is the summation of the 
numeric values achieved by each household against each indicator. All the indicators are 
assigned equal weight for simplicity of construction. The formula of this construction of 
threat of violence index is as follows: 





i x X   
Where,   xi denotes the value of indicators of violence (i=1,2,3,………….,13) 
    
From the estimation it is found that the lowest value for the composite violence index is 
13 while the highest value is 32. Households were grouped into three distinct categories, 
equally spaced by ranking scores according to the level of value of violence index. The 
categorization is as follows:  
 
Category 1: Households perceiving low violence, scores 13 to 19 in composite violence 
 index 
 
Category2: Households perceiving medium violence, scores 20 to 26 in composite 
 violence  index 
 
Category 3: Households perceiving high violence, scores 27 to 32 in composite violence 
 index 
 
Finally, three dummy variables were created for the three levels of perceived threat of 
violence in the data set, with the low violence perception dummy serving as the reference 
point. This categorization of households shows that 55% of indigenous households 
perceived low levels of violence, 36% households perceived medium level of violence, 
and 9% households  perceived high violence (see annex table 2).  
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Livelihood Decision-making Variables 
 
Three household decisions: consumption expenditure, investment decisions with regard 
to children’s schooling and production (cropping) decisions are analyzed. The descriptive 
statistics pertaining to these variables are given annex table 2.  
 
Data on Consumption Expenditure were analysed using a separate format for food and 
non-food expenditure from households. The calculation procedure for both food and non-
food consumption expenditure used the imputation methodology to monetize the 
expenditure where the consumption item was not bought or domestically produced. The 
average per capita annual cash-equivalent consumption expenditure was Tk. 11,847.  
 
We consider the decision to Enrol children in school as an investment (human capital 
accumulating) decision. Data on total number of children enrolled in both primary and 
secondary school were analysed at the household level, within the age brackets 6-18.  
 
We take Type of Crop Produced as the proxy for production-investment decisions. Data 
on types of crop produced show that a total number of 35 different types of crops are 
produced by indigenous households in CHT. At the first stage crops are grouped into 




Our quantitative analysis primarily focuses on the relation or association between the 
perceived threat of violence and livelihood decision-making by indigenous ethnic 
minority households. Thus our sample from the survey data set is confined to indigenous 
households in CHT. At the first stage, statistical tools such as bivariate analysis and non-
parametric tests were used. Annex table 3 shows the summary of specifications for 
household livelihood decision-making represented by consumption, investment and 
production decision. For consumption decisions an OLS model was used. But for 
investment in children’s education and production (cropping) decisions a Logit or Probit 
models were specified. The latter two cases measure the probability or chance of an event 
occurring. The standard regression equation is as follows: 
Yi = α + β1 HSEij + β2Hij + β3 Cij + β4 Sij + β5 Vij + β6PVij + εi 
 
Where the dependent variable, Yi refers to various livelihood decision-making variables, 
consisting of  consumption expenditure (continuous variable), child enrolment in either 
primary and secondary school (dummy variable) and type of crop produced (dummy 
variable) for household i measured at the survey. The explanatory variables are as 
follows:  HSEij are household-level socio-economic variables, Cij is a set of child 
characteristics (age and sex), Hij is the household heads’ characteristics, Sij denotes school 
level variable, Vij means variables for perceived threat of violence, PVij indicates pre-
peace accord experience of violence and εi is a random error term. One of our dependent 





This section analyses the determinants of household consumption decisions, followed by 
two other important livelihood decisions, investment in children’s education and cropping 
(production) decisions, in relation to varying degrees of subjective perceptions of the 
threat of violence. We believe this to be a major innovation of our study, because we  
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attempt to gauge the impact of subjective perceptions upon economic decision making 
with regard to consumption, output (cropping) and investment decisions after an uneasy 
peace accord that only imperfectly ended the conflict. Within the context we are studying, 
land dispossession is a key factor, and the continuing fear of intimidation with a view to 
further land alienation is likely to impact on indigenous households’ decision making 
under uncertainty. To this end, and to sharpen our focus and analysis, we classify 
individual indigenous household’s fears (of violence) into different intensities: high, 
medium and low.      
 
The conventional wisdom is that subsistence consumption recovers rapidly following the 
cessation of hostilities, as suggested by Organski and Kugler (1977) and Koubi (2005) 
who point to a ‘Phoenix’ factor in terms of rapid growth recovery following conflict. This 
is, however, a strictly macroeconomic phenomenon. Moving on to output, production in 
some sectors may, however, be adversely affected, due to damage to infrastructure 
(Murshed, 2010, chapter 6). Agricultural production is said to be particularly susceptible 
to these effects, compared to activities in the service sector and construction. This is 
unlikely to apply to our case, as the conflict in CHT was a low-intensity insurgency, and 
did not do much damage to the already low amount of infrastructure in this highly 
afforested region.     
 
With regard to household consumption decisions, we examine the influence of violence 
on consumption expenditure as a whole and for food and non-food consumption 
expenditure separately. Our results (OLS estimation) suggest that there is significant 
negative relationship between perceived violence and consumption expenditure decisions 
(Table 1).
10 We found that the households perceiving medium level of violence spend 4% 
less (per capita consumption) expenditure as compared to the households who perceive a 
low level of violence. Households perceiving high violence spend 10% less on 
consumption expenditure as compared to those households perceiving low violence.  
 
                                                            
10 Variables other than violence perceptions mainly act as control variables in the case of analyzing consumption 
expenditure. Endogenity and/or multicollinearity problems are avoided by excluding income from the explanatory 
variables, as it is likely to be related to perceptions of violence.   
17





Log of Per capita annual 
consumption expenditure 
Log of Per capita annual food 
consumption expenditure 
Log of Per capita annual 
non-food consumption 
expenditure 
HH size  -0.0562***  -0.0523***  -0.103*** 
 (0.00442)  (0.00464)  (0.00534) 
Age of HH head  -0.00103  -0.00127*  0.00129 
 (0.000628)  (0.000654)  (0.000794) 
Sex of HH head  0.0279  0.0294  0.0371* 
 (0.0170)  (0.0180)  (0.0217) 
Primary education of 
HHH 
0.0189 0.0189  0.0150 
 (0.0203)  (0.0212)  (0.0259) 
Secondary education of 
HHH  
0.0326 0.0343  0.00311 
 (0.0208)  (0.0216)  (0.0287) 
Above secondary 
education of HHH  
-0.0357 -0.0487 0.120 
 (0.136)  (0.143)  (0.130) 
Perceived medium 
violence 
-0.0414** -0.0351**  -0.115*** 
  (0.0170) (0.0178)  (0.0218) 
Perceived high 
violence 
-0.103*** -0.0977***  -0.156*** 
 (0.0232)  (0.0243)  (0.0346) 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
* In the regression results here and in other tables ‘perceived low violence’ is not reported as it is used as the reference point for the 
dummy variable capturing perceptions of violence.  
 
This adverse influence is found to be more in terms of both magnitude and statistical 
significance when only non-food expenditure is considered. Households perceiving 
medium and high violence spend 11.5% and 15.6% less on non-food consumption 
compared to those households perceiving low violence. The influence of perceived 
violence is found significantly higher for non-food consumption expenditure compared to 
food consumption for the households perceiving medium and high violence. As expected, 
household size also influences the amount of per capita consumption expenditure  
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negatively. We interpret the relation between different levels of perceived violence and 
amount of consumption expenditure considering the household as an active decision 
maker rather than as passive victims of violence. 
 
From the investment and production points of view the picture is somewhat different. 
Households perceiving higher levels of violence seem more interested in saving and 
investing in the production of cash crops, and in developing human capital compared to 
households who perceive less violence. This may also inhibit their consumption 
expenditures. This tendency may be even more applicable to relatively affluent 
households. The higher influence of perceived violence on non-food consumption 
expenditure decision can be explained by the fact that when households face any type of 
increasing risk they will first reduce their non-food expenditure to provide savings for 
future security, followed by food expenditure as food is a basic necessity.  
 
Investment in human capital in CHT is especially important as this may enable people to 
increase their productivity in agriculture and trading, and to participate in the process of 
income generation and remunerative employment in new occupations, as well as 
potentially migrate (UNDP, 1995). In terms of time horizons investment can be shorter 
term or longer term, with education being one of the longer term investments. Decisions 
to enrol children in school can be a proxy of investment decisions for the future, and 
because children are potentially suppliers of household labour it is not free of opportunity 
cost. Households also need to pay some or all of the educational expenses incurred (Bedi 
and Marshall, 2002).  
 
Our Probit regression results in table 2 indicate that variation in the likelihood of 
children’s enrolment is not significantly explained by differences in perceived violence as 
the coefficient is statistically insignificant. The variables on pre-peace accord experience 
of violence (displacement, land dispossession and experience; participation in or victim 
of armed conflict) are also found to be insignificant.  But introducing interaction terms 
for variables on pre-peace accord experience of violence and post-conflict perceived 
violence engenders statistical significance. The statistical significance of the interaction 
term points to the existence of a more complex mechanism effecting fears of violence on  
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local child enrolment. In other words, current perceptions of violence do impact on 
whether households choose to school their children locally, but it is related to other 
factors such as earlier experiences of violence, emigration and land dispossession.  
 
The interaction between displacement (which means the household left during the 
conflict and subsequently returned) and current perceived high violence is positive and 
statistically significant. This suggests that the households who were displaced before the 
peace accord, and currently perceive high violence, are more likely to send children to 
school (32.5%) compared to households who also migrated but perceive low violence 
levels. Similarly, households that experienced armed conflict before the peace accord, 
and currently perceive high violence are more likely to school children (26%) compared 
to households who experienced armed conflict and currently perceive low violence. 
 
Table 2: Determinants of child enrolment in school: Regression result 
 
Explanatory Variable  Dependent Variable; Child Enrolment 
Logit, mfx  Probit, mfx 
Age of child  0.147***  0.139*** 
 (0.0140)  (0.0129) 
Age square of child  -0.00571***  -0.00535*** 
 (0.000747)  (0.000705) 
Sex of child  0.0167  0.0263 
 (0.0358)  (0.0332) 
Age of HH head  0.000459  0.000447 
 (0.00124)  (0.00119) 
Sex of HH head  0.0241  0.0250 
 (0.0344)  (0.0331) 
Primary education of HHH  0.0475  0.0438 
 (0.0403)  (0.0383) 
Secondary education of HHH   0.0420  0.0421 
 (0.0445)  (0.0425) 
Above secondary education of HHH   -0.345***  -0.364*** 
 (0.0585)  (0.0587) 
Government school   0.0769**  0.0746** 
 (0.0362)  (0.0347) 
NGO school  0.154***  0.146*** 
 (0.0575)  (0.0547) 
Private school  -0.0132  -0.0198  
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 (0.0926)  (0.0916) 
Language of book  0.437*  0.427* 
 (0.261)  (0.244) 
Medium of instruction  -0.367*  -0.373** 
 (0.190)  (0.185) 
HH size  0.00582  0.00620 
 (0.00886)  (0.00858) 
HH asset  2.61e-07  2.49e-07 
 (2.75e-07)  (2.57e-07) 
Perceived medium violence  -0.0121  -0.0117 
 (0.0416)  (0.0400) 
Perceived high violence  -0.184**  -0.189** 
 (0.0752)  (0.0771) 
Migration -0.0710  -0.0718 
 (0.0717)  (0.0705) 
Land dispossession  0.148**  0.140** 
 (0.0624)  (0.0586) 
Past armed conflict  -0.0101  -0.00360 
 (0.0677)  (0.0658) 
Migration and perceived medium violence  0.0280  0.0385 
 (0.119)  (0.112) 
Migration and perceived high violence  0.326**  0.325** 
 (0.140)  (0.139) 
Land dispossession and perceived medium violence  0.00373  0.00480 
 (0.0916)  (0.0860) 
Land dispossession and perceived high violence  -0.285***  -0.293*** 
 (0.0681)  (0.0746) 
Past armed conflict and perceived medium violence  0.0358  0.0271 
 (0.0911)  (0.0872) 
Past armed conflict and perceived high violence  0.267**  0.258** 
 (0.124)  (0.119) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
This mutual reinforcing element in the combined violence variable is not applicable to 
households who experienced land dispossession before the peace accord. Our estimates 
suggest that households who experienced land dispossession before the peace accord, 
along with a high violence perception are less likely to school their children (29%), 
compared to those who also experienced land dispossession before the peace accord, but 
perceive low violence. The experience of land dispossession is traumatic, and creates 
huge economic vulnerabilities, as land is the most productive asset. This may lower the  
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likelihood of their sending their children to school, possibly due to rejection of Bengali 
culture.  
 
One anomalous finding relates to the fact that households with more educated heads 
(above secondary education) are less likely to school their children locally (by 36%). 
Discussions revealed that more educated households have a tendency to send their 
children to better quality schools further away (including as boarders), and even in the 
national capital. There are few educational institutions with free food and residential 
facilities established with the support of government and donors in CHT to enhance 
human capital development (Shelley 1992). The primary ‘investment’ motivation for 
schooling children is to allow future generations to acquire credentials so that they can 
escape the conflict and are less dependent on agriculture. This includes increased 
prospects of gaining formal and public sector jobs for their children.  
 
We classify production decisions, which involve entrepreneurial risk taking, into the 
amount of land to be cultivated, and types of crops to be produced.  Due to lack of data 
on relevant variables we apply non-parametric (chi-square) tests instead of regression 
analysis to gauge the impact of perceived violence on involvement in cultivation and type 
of cultivation across households (Table 3).  The majority of indigenous households (61%) 
engage in cropping own land, while the remainder derive their livelihoods from various 
occupations other than cropping own land. Estimates show that households perceiving 
medium and high violence accept more livelihood opportunities outside cropping own 
land, while only one-third of the total households with low perceptions of violence 
eschew crop cultivation. About a half of those experiencing medium or high levels of 
violence persist with cropping their own land. 
    
22
Table 3: Household involvement in agriculture by levels perceived violence (%) 
Perceived violence level  Household involvement (%) 
Cropping own land  Other activities  
Low violence  69  31 
Medium violence  50  50 
High violence  53  47 
All Categories  61  39 
* Pearson chi2 Pr = 0.000 
 
 
Further investigation into the choice of cultivation techniques among the households with 
cropping own land revealed that the proportion of jum cultivation relative to the use of 
the plough decreases with perceptions of violence. The former is the more traditional 
technique, employed by the indigenous peoples of CHT.  The variation in use of 
production techniques in relation with different levels of perceived violence is found 
statistically significant (Table 4). Jum as a type of cultivation technique is used by 28% to 
31% of households perceiving medium and high violence, while the figure is 52% for 
households perceiving low level of violence. On the other hand, plough cultivation is 
applied by about 73% to 75% households perceiving medium and high level of violence, 
whereas 67% households with low levels of threats employ plough cultivation as their 
production technique. The point being that the trauma of violence draws indigenous 
households away from traditional slash and burn (jum) cultivation to the use of the 
plough. This can also mean that they are forced to relocate in plain lands, and are 
compelled to economise on both labour and land as jum cultivation is more intensive in 
both factors of production. 
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Table 4: Household reported technique of cultivation by levels perceived violence  
Perceived violence level  Technique of Cultivation (%) 
Jum  Plough Both 
Low violence  52.3  66.6  19.0 
Medium violence  28.4  72.6  1.0 
High violence  30.7  75.3  6.0 
All Categories  31.0  56.4  12.57 
* Pearson chi2 Pr = 0.000  
**Note: The reported proportion of households using Jum and plough as technique of cultivation 
considers the ‘both’ as additive. 
 
Regression results for the influence of perceived violence on proportion of cultivated land 
to total land (land use) indicate that households (cropping own land) perceiving medium 
levels of violence cultivated 30% more land as a proportion of the total land they possess 
compared to households perceiving low levels of violence, and the result is statistically 
significant (Table 5). Apart from perceived violence, growing both food and cash crops 
statistically significantly raises land use by 43%. 
 
In the CHT the majority of indigenous households who crop their own land (60%) 
produce mixed crops, with 38% engaged in only food crops. It has to be borne in mind 
that cash crop cultivation involves more risk of physical and economic loss, and we 
would expect more subsistence food cultivation following conflict, and the trauma of 
violence. The proportion of household producing only cash crops is negligible. 
Regression techniques using logit and probit regression were run where the endogenous 
variable mixed crop is in the form of a dummy variable (0 and 1), and the results are 
reported in table 6. When we relate these figures to the subjective experience of violence 
the proportion of households producing mixed crops is 63%, 61% and 58% for those 
households perceiving high, medium and low levels of violence respectively. It appears 
that the propensity for mixed cultivation rises slightly with subjective perceptions of 
violence.   
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Table 5: Determinants of amount of land cultivated: OLS Estimation 
Explanatory Variables  Dependent variable: Log of proportion of amount of land cultivated to total land 
HH size  -0.0111 
  (0.0264) 
Age of HH head  0.000460 
  (0.00403) 
Gender of HH head  0.101 
  (0.112) 
Primary education of HHH  -0.153 
  (0.131) 
Secondary education of HHH   0.0836 
  (0.141) 
Above secondary education of HHH   0.417 
  (0.627) 
Cash crop  -1.343*** 
  (0.420) 
Both food and cash crop  0.430*** 
  (0.116) 
Jum Cultivation  0.155 
  (0.114) 
Both Jum and plough cultivation  0.0536 
  (0.242) 
Perceived medium violence  0.306*** 
  (0.115) 
Perceived high violence  0.0870 
  (0.176) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The estimated coefficient (at 1% level) for medium level of perceived violence suggests 
that this type of households are more likely to produce mixed crops by about 8% in 
comparison with the households perceiving low level of violence. Similarly, households 
perceiving high levels of violence are producing more mixed crop by 8%, compared to 
the households perceiving low levels of violence, this result is statistically significant at a 
5% level. The variables, different levels of perceived violence (both medium and high) 
are found positively related with the mixed crop production with statistical significance 
across the logit and probit regression models. Our findings are qualitatively similar to that 
of Nillesen and Verwimp (2010) for post-conflict rural Burundi, where the cultivation of 
cash crops also increased. In addition to the variable of interest (perceived level of 
violence) it also found that there are some other explanatory variables; age of household  
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head,   sex of household head, household head passed secondary education, amount of 
land cultivated, and plough cultivation  which also have significant association with the 
dependent variable, mixed cropping. We find that greater education and age in the head 
of household enhances the probability of mixed crop cultivation as a riskier activity than 
food crop alone. 
 
 
Our apparently anomalous results, with respect to rising risk taking in cropping patterns 
following greater subjective feelings of violent experiences, can only be explained by less 
well known theories about risky behaviour. Conventional wisdom would suggest that 
individuals become more risk averse after an adverse shock, such as conflict and the fear 
of violence. This is also the prediction of expected utility theory in conjunction with the 
concavity property of standard utility functions leading to the properties of diminishing 
marginal utility of income, as well as absolute risk aversion. The standard precepts of 
expected utility do not, however, hold in many contexts. In our case, we can argue that 
both land dispossession and subjective perceptions of violence amount to ‘trauma’, which 
has a pecuniary counterpart that may be characterised as one where the concerned 
individual or household has sustained a financial loss. Markowitz (1952) indicated that 
starting from a state of loss; individuals are wont to engage in more risk taking to regain 
their previous valued position, than when their wealth portfolio is exhibiting positive 
growth (profit) and their expectations are over-fulfilled. Secondly, he also pointed out 
that what may matter more for decisions to engage in risky projects is the distribution of 
possible profit or loss it may entail, rather than the absolute (expected) value of risky 
prospect. In other words, the direction of change in the individual’s asset position and the 
possibility of regaining a highly valued asset in monetary or social terms are more salient 
than its level.  
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Table 6: Determinant of production of mixed crop: Regression results 
  
Explanatory Variables  Dependent Variable : Mixed Crop 
 Logit,  mfx  Probit,  mfx 
HH size  -0.00637  -0.00700 
 (0.00625)  (0.00648) 
Age of HH head  0.00177*  0.00179* 
 (0.000976)  (0.00100) 
Sex of HH head  -0.0467*  -0.0463* 
 (0.0267)  (0.0273) 
Primary education of HH head  0.0153  0.0137 
 (0.0306)  (0.0315) 
Secondary education of HH head  0.0733**  0.0737** 
 (0.0318)  (0.0332) 
Above secondary education of HH head  0.00974  0.00255 
 (0.145)  (0.146) 
Amount of land cultivated  0.000579***  0.000517*** 
 (7.83e-05)  (7.07e-05) 
Type of cultivation; Plough  0.0607**  0.0642** 
 (0.0264)  (0.0270) 
Type of cultivation: jum and plough  -0.0334  -0.0323 
 (0.0536)  (0.0546) 
Perceived medium violence  0.0735***  0.0782*** 
  (0.0263) (0.0269) 
Perceived High violence  0.0815**  0.0803** 
 (0.0378)  (0.0402) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Following Kahneman and Tversky (1979) we may utilize prospect theory to explain our 
empirical findings with regard to cropping patterns, bearing in mind that cash crop 
cultivation is more risky, as it does not guarantee the household’s subsistence and is more 
subject to market fluctuations. Prospect theory represents a departure from expected 
utility in that it is a two stage process, and risky ventures are weighted not just by 
(subjective) probability of the different risky states, but by a more complicated ‘decision 
weighting’ process. The first stage of the decision involves, an editing phase where a 
reference point is chosen to evaluate the likely effect of the actual risky investment 
framed in terms of specific aspects of the highly valued by the decision maker. As has 
been indicated, following the trauma of eviction and/or violence, individuals may feel 
that the key value of assets have diminished and must be replaced as a priority. In the 
second stage of evaluation, when the household decides on its type of crop investments, it  
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may take more risks, if the risky project has a high enough decision weight compared to 
the less risky alternative. Decision weighting is related to the probability of an uncertain 
project bearing fruition, but it also includes the subjective desirability of the outcome, a 
property that alters less readily in the mind than the pure probability of success. The point 
being that taking on more risks is understandable if there is a substantial chance that more 
risky investments will lead to recuperation of particular erstwhile losses. This may 
explain why households with a greater perception of violence are more likely to invest in 
the more risky cash crops, as well as increase land use in agriculture.
11   
 
5  Conclusions  
 
This research suggests that heightened subjective perceptions of violence may lower 
consumption expenditure as a risk reducing tactic, while raising land use intensity and 
risky mixed crop cultivation. In some cases relatively high perceptions of violence raises 
the likelihood of households schooling their children. But this effect only becomes 
significant when combined with specific forms of conflict experiences. This indicates that 
a post-conflict ‘phoenix’ factor may be in operation at the household level in which some 
income raising livelihood decisions are made as a consequence of fear of renewed 
violence. In the short-run, the factor appears to operate through both increased land use 
and cash crop cultivation and in the long run through increased human capital. Arguably, 
these decisions can be seen as raising the risk threshold as the quality of land may 
deteriorate, cash crops may be more vulnerable to pests and disease and price falls, and 
the chances of getting a significant return from schooling are not only far in the future, 




11Following Kahneman and Tversky (1979), let the value (V) of the household’s risky prospect be: 
. 0 , ) ( )] , ( 1 [ ) ( ) , ( , )]; ( ) ( )[ , ( ) ( ) , , , ( 2 1 > − + − = = π π π π π L L y v L p x v L p or y v x v L p y v L p y x V
Here  v(x) is the value of the risky project; v(y) is the value of the less risky project; p refers to the 
probability of success of x, π is the decision weight which is a positive function of both the probability of 
success, and losses (L) previously sustained. It is immediately apparent that an increase in losses due to 
perceptions of violence will raise the attractiveness of the risky project by weighing the decision weight 
more heavily in favour of x.  
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The absence of positive social capital binding indigenous and Bengali communities in the 
CHT area may explain the persistence of subjective fears of future violence. In India, in 
the context of sectarian conflict between Hindus and Muslims, Jha (2008) points out that  
Hindu-Muslim riots are remarkably absent in certain coastal communities who maintain 
older, historical, economic division of labour based on complementarities along with 
local institutions that build trust unlike in other areas where there is greater competition 
and mistrust. He contrasts Surat and Ahmadabad in the Indian state of Gujarat in this 
connection, where the former avoided riots and violence, while the latter does not. Both 
communities in CHT, Bengali and indigenous, are competing over the same resource, 
land, and there is little in terms of bridging social capital to allay the fears of indigenous 
peoples regarding the future prospect of violence.  
 
It may be possible that there is a reaction to higher fear of violence after an imperfect 
accord ending a low-intensity conflict aimed at autonomy and not secession. This 
reaction may make some people bolder and more risk taking in order to enhance their 
long-term future in the context of likely macro-political continuity, albeit with significant 
fear of future violence at the household micro-level. Prospect theory may also be useful 
in understanding this reaction, as people frame their decisions in the light of socio-
economic priorities that precede any valuation of the consequences of greater risk-taking. 
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Annex Table 1: Recoding of response on violence indicators for construction of Violence Index 
Variable name   The original question/format of data collection  Adjustment to get new variable  
Current status of constraint of peace 
Abduction  No response= 99,  Low =1, Medium =2, High =3  No response and Low =1, Medium=2 and High =3 
Extortion   No response= 99,  Low =1, Medium =2, High =3  No response and Low =1, Medium=2 and High =3 
Armed conflict   No response= 99,  Low =1, Medium =2, High =3  No response and Low =1, Medium=2 and High =3 
Communal Threat   No response= 99,  Low =1, Medium =2, High =3  No response and Low =1, Medium=2 and High =3 
Restricted 
movement                    
No response= 99,  Low =1, Medium =2, High =3  No response and Low =1, Medium=2 and High =3 
Insecurity of women   No response= 99,  Low =1, Medium =2, High =3  No response and Low =1, Medium=2 and High =3 
Insecurity of 
children  
No response= 99,  Low =1, Medium =2, High =3  No response and Low =1, Medium=2 and High =3 
Trust on other 
communities                
No response= 99,  Low =1, Medium =2, High =3  No response and Low =1, Medium=2 and High =3 
Eviction from land  No response= 99,  Low =1, Medium =2, High =3  No response and Low =1, Medium=2 and High =3 




Friendly and proactive=1, Friendly=2, Moderately friendly = 
3, Some how friendly = 4, Not at all friendly = 5 
(Friendly and proactive=1, Friendly=2)=Low=1, 
(Moderately friendly = 3) = 0 and Some how 
friendly = 4)= Medium=2, and (Not at all friendly 
= 5)= High=3 
Safety and security 
feelings 
Highly secured=1, Secured=2,  
Moderately secured= 3,  Some how secured= 4,  
Not at all secured = 5 
(Highly secured=1, Secured=2)=Low=1, 
Moderately secured= 3)=0 and (Some how 
secured= 4)=Medium=2, and (Not at all secured = 
5)= High=3 
Cultural freedom  Highly secured=1, Secured=2,  
Moderately secured= 3, Some how secured= 4,  
Not at all secured = 5 
(Highly secured=1, Secured=2)=Low=1, 
Moderately secured= 3)=0 and (Some how 
secured= 4)=Medium=2, and (Not at all secured = 
5)= High=3 
Customary right  Highly secured=1, Secured=2,  
Moderately secured= 3, Some how secured= 4,  
Not at all secured = 5 
(Highly secured=1, Secured=2)=Low=1, 
Moderately secured= 3)=0 and (Some how 
secured= 4)=Medium=2, and (Not at all secured = 
5)= High=3 
Experience of violence before peace accord 
Migration   Did anybody/somebody from your household migrate out of 
the Para before signing the peace treaty?    
Yes = 1  No = 2  
If yes, Reasons of migration out: 
Lack of security =2, Evicted from land =3, Communal 
conflict =4, Political conflict =5, Government policy/program 
=10    
 If YES and due to these reasons then 1 and 
otherwise 0 
 




Did you/ your father/ grand father ever dispossessed of any 
land, which belonged to you as agricultural land/ land under 
possession /homestead (i.e, whether your land was engulfed 
by anyone)? Yes = 1,  No = 2  
 
Yes = 1  No = 0  
 
Armed conflict   Whether any member of your household experienced armed 
violence before CHT treaty? No=1, Self=2, other household 
member=3, Self and household member=4  
(Self=2, other household member=3, Self and 
household member=4) = Yes=1, No=0 
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Annex Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables  Mean Value  Standard Deviation  Number of 
Observation 
Per capita annual consumption expenditure (food and non-food) 
(in Taka) 
11,847 4518  1786 
Log of per capita annual consumption expenditure (food)  9.31  0.343  1786 
Log of per capita annual consumption expenditure (non-food)  9.24  0.354  1786 
Log of per capita annual consumption expenditure (food and 
non-food) 
6.50 0.467  1786 
Child enrolment in primary and secondary school  0.41  0.492  1987 
Involvement in agriculture  0.61    1786 
Type of cultivation      
Plough cultivation  0.57    1075 
Jum cultivation  0.31    1075 
Both Jum and plough cultivation  0.12    1075 
Amount of land cultivated  259.8  353.7  1446 
Log of proportion of cultivated land of total land  0.51  1.84  1360 
Type of crops produced      
Only food  0.38  0.486  1446 
Only cash  0.20  0.137  1446 
Mixed (Both food and cash) crop  0.59  0.490  1446 
Household size  5.20  2.055  1786 
HH asset  50,858  1047  1786 
Age of household head   38.8  13.39  1786 
Sex of household head  0.61  0.48  1786 
HH head never attended school  0.58  0.49  1057 
HH head completed primary school  0.23  0.42  1057 
HH head completed secondary School  0.17  0.38  1057 
HH head completed above secondary School  0.01  0.091  1057 
Age of child  7.13  4.75  1987 
Age square of child  73.5  83.7  1987 
Sex of child (Male=1)  0.64  0.481  1987 
Type of School studied      
 Government  school    0.56  0.49  1122 
 NGO  school  0.30  0.45  1122 
 Private  school  0.10  0.31  1122 
  Other type of school  0.03  0.16  1122 
Language of book (Mother tongue)  0.21  0.41  1633 
Medium of instruction (Mother tongue)  0.22  0.41  1633 
Low level of perceived violence  0.55  0.497  1786 
Medium level of perceived violence  0.38  0.485  1786 
High level of perceived violence  0.07  0.254  1786 
Experience of violence before peace accord       
 Migration  0.13  0.338  1786 
 Land  dispossession  0.20  0.392  1786 
 Armed  conflict  0.19  0.393  1786 
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Production Decision Equation  
Amount of land 
cultivated 
Type of crops 
produced 
Endogenous variables  
Log of per capita annual 
consumption expenditure (food and 
non-food) 
LHS     
Child enrolment in primary and 
secondary school 
 LHS    
Amount of land cultivated      LHS   
Type of crops produced        LHS 
Exogenous variables 
Household size  √  √  √  √ 
Age of household head   √  √  √  √ 
Sex of household head  √  √  √  √ 
HH head never attended school*  √  √  √  √ 
HH head completed primary school  √  √  √  √ 
HH head completed secondary 
School 
√  √  √  √ 
HH head completed above secondary 
School 
√  √  √  √ 
Age of child    √    
Age square of child    √    
Sex of child    √    
Government school     √    
NGO school    √    
Private school    √    
Other type of school*    √    
Language of book     √    
Medium of instruction     √    
HH asset    √    
Food crop*      √  √ 
Cash crop      √  √ 
Both food and cash crop      √  √ 
Plough cultivation*      √  √ 
Jum cultivation      √  √ 
Both Jum and plough cultivation      √  √ 
Amount of land cultivated        √ 
Low threat of violence*  √  √  √  √ 
Medium threat of violence  √  √  √  √ 
High threat of violence  √  √  √  √ 
Interaction variables    √    
Notes: LHS indicates that a variable is included as endogenous variable in the left-hand-side of the 
equation. ‘√’ indicates that a variable is included as exogenous variable.  * denotes as reference category 
































































































































        